Reframing Veteran Suicide: Part III
In Part I, I considered the veteran paradox—a contradiction between the ideals of military service and life after separation. In Part II, I summarized the most prominent disparities between veteran and civilian outcomes. Here, I will connect the two ideas by examining how Service Members (SMs) are trained, and how certain aspects of the military’s culture, like conflating pain and gain, can exacerbate reintegration challenges. I will conclude by examining how the current one-size-fits-all approach fails to address these challenges.
Training
Joining the military begins by replacing individual identities with those of a team. All SMs are conditioned for obedience and collectivism from the start. In achieving greater rank and responsibility, SMs gain the freedom exercise greater judgement, adaptability, and apply critical thinking to solve problems in the absence of orders. For our junior enlisted, however, opportunities and experiences for greater autonomy in decision making never develop to the extent they might with junior officers and senior Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs).
If a SM’s most formative experience has been defined by unquestioned authority, then what would it take to prepare you for absolute autonomy, e.g., life as a civilian? What happens when all your basic needs, from income and insurance to food, are controlled and provided by the government for years, and then disappear? What happens when you lose a powerful and respected identity that is defined by its purpose? What does it mean to become solely accountable for your success or failure after years of an institution controlling your life?
Some answers may be found in a 2015 study conducted by the Institute for Military Veterans and Military Families at Syracuse. They surveyed 8500 SMs to assess their perceptions of transition. The number one challenge, identified by the sample population, was navigating benefits (60%), followed by finding a job (55%), adjusting to civilian culture (41%), addressing financial challenges (40%), and applying military-learned skills to civilian life (39%).[1] SMs struggle with the very tasks transition assistance programs are designed to address. At best this reflects the friction inherent to switching careers. At worst, this means the current model isn’t working.
Culture
Leaders have a tremendous impact on the junior SM experience through the policies and incentives they enforce. Trivial decisions can have tremendous impact on the overall trust that subordinates have in their leadership and the institutions they rely on. This is particularly true when low levels of unproductive stress, e.g., sleep deprivation and poor nutrition, build up over time. In a previous blog post, I discussed the potential downside of confusing privation with effectiveness in training. I argued that when “pain” is considered both necessary and sufficient for “gain,” a unit undermines its actual performance objectives. While there is definitely a time and place to build combat resilience through adverse conditions, accepting privation when it is counterproductive needlessly degrades unit morale and performance.
It is commonplace, for example, to expect long hours and gas-station lunches as the norm in garrison. There are rarely any consequences for commanders who fail to implement predictable schedules that enable healthy sleep habits and access to reliable nutrition even though dining facilities are subsidized by junior SM wages. It would be unfair to place the entire burden on the mid-level leaders, however, as the problem usually starts much higher. In the Army, for example, Daily Tasking Orders (DTOs) that originate several echelons above line units fragment the companies and platoons into support tasks that constrain subordinate commanders. The common refrain from higher leadership is usually some version of “figure it out” or “it’s always been this way, so deal with it.” Ironically, these sentiments undermine the Army’s espoused beliefs about Mission Command—the doctrinal focus on commander intent and subordinate empowerment. As a result, leaders fail to recognize the systemic neglect of basic SM needs as the self-sabotage that it is.
Of course, it would be naïve to suggest that life in garrison should be perfectly regimented and predictable. The goal isn’t to make the military easy. Nor should the goal be to make life difficult as an end in itself. Rather, adversity should be a means of developing SMs in certain contexts, like training for combat. The difference between privation as an ends and privation as a means of preparing for combat is purpose, i.e., there is a connection between the stress they experience and some desired outcome. Otherwise, accepting privation as the natural state of things in garrison has consequences. For those at the receiving end of poor planning and coordination that result in unnecessarily chaotic daily life, the implicit message is that SM time isn’t valuable. This idea festers until it is considered as the default-‘I’m at the bottom of this organization and I have no agency over my life.’ Eventually the message may be interpreted as ‘I am not valuable.’
The death of SPC Vanessa Guillén and subsequent Report of the Fort Hood Independent Review Committee (FHIRC) illuminates two disturbing trends: the extent to which leaders failed to meet basic SM needs, and the fact that these failures are not unique to Fort Hood. From access to the mess hall and barracks maintenance to matters of human dignity and shared values, there were multiple levels of failure, particularly with respect to the Army’s Sexual Harassment Assault and Response Program (SHARP). I found this passage particularly damning:
“The end result has been a SHARP Program that appeared to be compliant on the surface, but was hollow and lacking in leadership attention, day-to-day implementation, broad acceptance by the enlisted Soldiers, and full inculcation into the culture and character of the Fort Hood community. If ever there was a need for intrusive hands-on leadership with regards to the health and welfare of troops, Fort Hood is and was the environment.”[2]
Veteran suicides aren’t caused by hungry soldiers or mold in the barracks. It is clear, however, that overlooking basic quality of life and failing to live up to espoused military values can contribute to the worst problems imaginable. To those at the bottom of the totem pole, the implicit message is clear: “you are expendable, you have no agency to change your environment, and if you can’t hack it you are weak.”
Veteran Transitions
Finally, the state of military-civilian transitions also matters with respect to veteran suicide, i.e., there is a correlation between risk factors, like unemployment, with the suicide rate. A 2014 study by the Rand Corporation found that after controlling for education, demographics, and citizenship, veterans are less likely to be employed than non-veterans by a small margin. The key findings are that employment rates improve over time for veterans, with the worst outcomes in the first months after separation. The greatest employment gap was 8.1% greater than civilians, and occurred for male veterans 18-24 between 2009 and 2012.[3] The empirical data does not support traditional narratives such as perceptions about veteran mental health, job selection bias, employer discrimination, and skills mismatch to explain the lower veteran employment rates. However, the data does support the claim that switching costs related to leaving the military play an important role: recently separated experience unemployment at the highest rates. As outlined in Part II, they also have the highest rates of suicide.
A Way Forward
I started this company based on a simple hypothesis: veteran outcomes are inconsistent with veteran capability. Veteran suicide is one outcome which I believe can be influenced during and after service. First, the military should de-couple the idea of privation and effectiveness. This would increase the quality of life and ultimately unit performance—two improvements that positively reframe a junior SM’s understanding of their value to the world. Second, we should instill autonomy and agency in our most junior SMs prior to their reintegration. The characteristics of a successful junior SM do not always translate to the civilian job search. In many ways they are contradictory. We have initial entry training to indoctrinate all SMs; perhaps we should have a structured process—a reverse bootcamp—for the highest risk veterans. Finally, the military should restructure the transition assistance program in a way that allocates resources according to the empirical evidence. This will mitigate the one-size-fits-all approach and risk of become obsessed with the process, i.e., checking boxes and briefing completion rates instead of outcomes.
From the start, I have envisioned Outlaws Inc. as a way to augment, not replace, the current transition assistance system. I view veteran suicide as one of many problems impacting more than just the veteran community. Our objective is to strengthen American communities by utilizing talent that is currently falling through the cracks. If you share that vision, we are eager to work with you.
[1] Fay, D., Maury, R., & Zoli, C. (2015). Missing Perspectives: Servicemembers’ Transition from Service to Civilian Life. Syracuse: Syracuse University.
[2] Swecker, C., Harmon, J. P., Ricci, C. F., Rodriguez, Q., & White, J. L. (2020, November 06). Report of the Fort Hood Independent Review Committee. Retrieved February 08, 2021, from https://www.army.mil/e2/downloads/rv7/forthoodreview/2020-12-03_FHIRC_report_redacted.pdf
[3] Loughran, David S., Why Is Veteran Unemployment So High?. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation,2014. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR284.html
